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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This appeal is within the jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(f), since it involves an appeal from a court of record in a criminal case not
involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

Appointed appellate counsel, Randall Allen, who was not Appellant's counsel in the district
court proceedings which are appealed here, has discussed the appeal with the Appellant and reviewed
the record, and there are two categories of issues to be presented.
The first category are issues which Appellant desires to be included in the appeal, but for
which Appellant counsel believes there are not grounds for appeal, and they are as follows:

A. Ineffective assistance: Whether the Defendant can raise ineffective assistance of counsel
on appeal, after having been convicted below pursuant to a guilty plea entered following a plea
bargain.

B. Sentence Imposed: Whether the Court abused its discretion in imposing sentence, in
terms of its harshness, i.e. prison terms with the term on one count to run consecutive and the entire
sentence to run consecutive to any term of incarceration already imposed upon the Defendant in
Alaska). Note, this generalized issue of the harshness of the sentence is presented in distinction to
1

issues D and E below, which focus on more specific aspects of the sentencing.

C. Motion to Withdraw Plea and For New Lawyer: Whether the Court erred in denying
Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Plea and For New Lawyer.
The second category are issues which Appellant desires to be included in the appeal, and for
which Appellant counsel believes there are grounds, and they are as follows:

D. Court's Proceeding with Sentencing Despite Prosecutors' Reneging on Promise to
Recommend Concurrent Sentences: Whether the Court erred in not enforcing the prosecutors'
promise in the plea bargain, namely the promise to recommend concurrent sentences, i.e. whether
the Court should have halted the proceedings and not proceeded to sentencing, and/or instructed the
prosecutors to honor their promise and recommend concurrent sentences in the sentencing hearing,
rather than simply allowing the prosecutors to change their position at sentencing.

E. Ordering the Utah Sentence to Run Consecutive to a Pre-existing Alaska Sentence,
Yet Remanding Appellant to the Utah Department of Corrections for Service of the Utah
Sentence First: Whether the Court erred in ordering that the Utah sentence run consecutive to a preexisting Alaska sentence, yet remanding the Appellant to the Utah Department of Corrections for
service of the Utah sentence first.

Issues A, B, and C, are presented after the manner of Anders, see Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967). In other words, the Defendant/Appellant desires to assert those issues, but counsel
2

upon reviewing the record, does not believe there is a basis for their assertion, and so counsel is
submitting those issues by way of disclosure and basic discussion of the legal reasons why they are,
in counsel's opinion, not viable. Appellate counsel has submitted the portions of the draft of this
brief dealing with those issues to the Appellant and discussed them with him in person at the
correctional facility in Millard County, where he is presently serving time, and has thus complied
with the requirements of submitting those issues after the manner of Anders, having exercised due
diligence in attempting to formulate support for those issues, to the best of his ability, having made
a conscientious examination of the record in this case and having set forth herein any points and
authorities relating to those issues, that might arguably support the appeal, and having furnished the
Defendant/Appellant with a copy of the portions of the draft of this brief dealing with those issues
and discussed the same with Defendant/Appellant. Counsel's signature at the end of this brief
constitutes counsel's certification and attestation of those facts stated in this paragraph, regarding
his duties under Anders,
Because there are two issues, issues D and E, which appellate counsel is submitting not after
the manner of Anders, counsel is not seeking to withdraw.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Ineffective assistance: Regarding ineffective assistance, ineffective assistance claims
relating to cases wherein conviction was entered pursuant to the entry of a guilty plea are waived if
not raised prior to sentencing. Failure to file a timely motion to withdraw a guilty plea "extinguishes
a defendant's right to challenge the validity of the guilty plea on appeal," State v. Reyes, 2002 UT
3

I3,1f 3, 40 P.3d 630, including any right to challenge the guilty plea on the basis of ineffective
assistance of counsel. See State v. Melo, 2001 UT App 392,1flj 7-8, 40 P.3d 646.

B. Sentence Imposed: Regarding the sentence imposed, the sentencing decision of a trial
court is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See State v. Houkf906 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah Ct.App.1995)
(per curium). "An abuse of discretion results when the judge Tails to consider all legally relevant
factors' or if the sentence imposed is 'clearly excessive.' " State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1235
(Utah 1990) (citations omitted).

C. Motion to Withdraw Plea and For New Lawyer: Regarding the motion to withdraw
plea and for a new lawyer, while such a motion was filed by the Defendant/Appellant prior to
sentencing, that motion was withdrawn by the Defendant in the hearing thereon, and thus was not
submitted for decision, and thus was not denied by the Court, and therefore no valid argument for
error can be made. See Record at 124.

D. Court's Proceeding with Sentencing Despite Prosecutors' Reneging on Promise to
Recommend Concurrent Sentences: The Appellant is not challenging any factual finding made
by the Court, and thus the standard of review is that applied to legal rulings, de novo. See Crossland
Savings v. Hatch, 877 P.2d 1241, 1243 n. 4 (Utah 1994).

E. Ordering the Utah Sentence to Run Consecutive to a Pre-existing Alaska Sentence,
Yet Remanding Appellant to the Utah Department of Corrections for Service of the Utah
Sentence First: The Appellant is not challenging any factual finding made by the Court, and thus
the standard of review is that applied to legal rulings, de novo. See Crossland Savings v. Hatch, 877
P.2d 1241, 1243 n. 4 (Utah 1994). Note, this issue was not raised below, but this appeal is of the
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final judgment, as opposed to some ruling made prior thereto, and thus is appropriately raised for
the first time on appeal.

PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE

A. Ineffective assistance: Regarding ineffective assistance, no ineffective assistance of
counsel claim was raised until after sentence was pronounced; the issue was raised for the first time
thereafter, and thus is being asserted only now in this appeal.

B. Sentence Imposed: Regarding the sentence imposed, the challenge to the sentence is
being raised for the first time through this appeal.

C. Motion to Withdraw Plea and For New Lawyer: Regarding the motion to withdraw
plea and for a new lawyer, that motion was withdrawn by the Defendant in the hearing thereon, and
thus was not denied by the Court, thus no valid argument for error can be made. See Record at 124.

D. Court's Proceeding with Sentencing Despite Prosecutors' Reneging on Promise to
Recommend Concurrent Sentences: Defense counsel at sentencing did indicate the prosecutors
promised to recommend concurrent sentences, see Record at 125, Transcript of Sentencing, at p. 5.
The prosecutor handling the sentencing hearing, however, disavowed any such promise, see id.,
Transcript of Sentencing at p. 8, though the Court responded by indicating that the promise had been
put on the record, see id.; however, the prosecutor went forward to recommend consecutive
5

sentences, and the Court did not respond to this departure from the plea-bargain promise. See id.

E. Ordering the Utah Sentence to Run Consecutive to a Pre-existing Alaska Sentence,
Yet Remanding Appellant to the Utah Department of Corrections for Service of the Utah
Sentence First: This issue was not specifically raised below, but the Defense did argue for
concurrent sentences and against consecutive sentences, see Record at 125, Transcript of Sentencing,
at p. 5-7. The Court's final judgment that the Defendant/Appellant should serve consecutive
sentences is appropriately raised for the first time on appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Defendant/Appellant entered a guilty plea to Burglary of a Dwelling, a second degree
felony, Possession of Stolen Property, a second degree felony, and Attempted Burglary of a
Dwelling, a third degree felony, with the pleas being entered on or about November 30, 2004.
See Record at 78-83. Regarding the motion to withdraw plea and for a new lawyer, that motion was
withdrawn by the Defendant in the hearing thereon, which occurred prior to sentencing, and thus was
not submitted to nor denied by the Court, thus no valid argument for error can be made. See Record
at 124.
Defendant/Appellant's conviction was entered and he was sentenced to one to fifteen years
in prison on each of the two second degree felonies, and to zero to five years on the third degree
felony, with the two second degree felony terms to run concurrent with each other, the third degree
felony term to run consecutive to those two second degree felony terms, and all three terms to run
6

consecutively to any term of imprisonment from any other, separate case, which "the Defendant may
currently be serving," but remanded him to the Utah Department of Corrections to serve his Utah
sentence before serving any term the Defendant may currently have been serving. See id. The Court
specifically indicated that he was to serve the Utah sentence in the instant case consecutive to an
Alaska case sentence he was presently under order out of an Alaska court to serve. See Record at
125, Transcript of Sentencing, at p. 15. The Presentence Investigation Report indicated that indeed
the Defendant/Appellant had an active warrant, due to being a prison parole escapee out of
Anchorage, Alaska. See Record at 78, Presentence Investigation Report, at p. 5.
Defense counsel at sentencing did indicate that the prosecutors promised to recommend
concurrent sentences, see Recordat 125, Transcript of Sentencing, at p. 5. The prosecutor handling
the sentencing hearing, however, disavowed any such promise, see id., Transcript of Sentencing at
p. 8, though the Court responded by indicating that the promise had been put on the record, see id.;
however, the prosecutor went forward to recommend consecutive sentences, and the Court did not
respond to this departure from the promise at plea bargain by either stopping the proceedings to
resolve the issue or by instructing the prosecutors to maintain their promised position of concurrent
sentences; instead the Court merely acknowledged that the prosecutors' promise of concurrent
sentences was made part of the record at the time of the entry of plea, and proceeds to sentence the
Defendant to consecutive sentences. See id.
No ineffective assistance related motion, and no motion to withdraw, was submitted to the
Court for decision to the District Court. See Record, passim.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
7

A.

Ineffective assistance:

Regarding ineffective assistance of counsel, Utah law

unequivocally provides that ineffective assistance claims for defendants who plead guilty are waived
if not raised until after sentence is imposed, where no motion to withdraw plea was made prior
thereto. This Defendant pleaded guilty, no motion to withdraw plea was submitted for decision to
the judge, and any such motion was withdrawn, and the case proceeded to the point that sentence was
imposed, and the ineffective assistance claim is being made now on appeal. This court has no
jurisdiction to hear this claim. Appellate counsel submits this argument, nonetheless, at the behest
of the Appellant, after the manner of Anders.

B. Sentence Imposed: Regarding the sentence imposed, the sentencing judge sentenced the
defendant within the legal parameters for the crimes for which he was convicted, and the record does
not reveal any reasonable argument for the position that the Court abused its discretion in imposing
0-5 years imprisonment. Appellate counsel submits this argument, nonetheless, at the behest of the
Appellant, after the manner of Anders.

C. Motion to Withdraw Plea and For New Lawyer: Regarding the motion to withdraw
plea and for a new lawyer, that motion was withdrawn by the Defendant in the hearing thereon, and
thus was not denied by the Court, thus no valid argument for error can be made. See Record at 124.
Appellate counsel submits this argument, nonetheless, at the behest of the Appellant, after the
manner of Anders.
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D. Court's Proceeding with Sentencing Despite Prosecutors' Reneging on Promise to
Recommend Concurrent Sentences: Defense counsel at sentencing did indicate the prosecutors
promised to recommend concurrent sentences, see Record at 125, Transcript of Sentencing, at p. 5.
The prosecutor handling the sentencing hearing, however, disavowed any such promise, see id.,
Transcript of Sentencing at p. 8, though the Court responded by indicating that the promise had been
put on the record, see id.; however, the prosecutor went forward to recommend consecutive
sentences, and the Court did not respond to this departure from the plea-bargain promise. See id.
The Defendant/Appellant was entitled to have the prosecutors follow through with their
promised recommendation of concurrent sentences, and the Court, which indicated that such promise
had been made and put on the record at the time of the entry of plea, should have not ignored the
Prosecutors' departure from that promise, and should have taken action to correct the breach,
forestalling the sentencing and resolving the issue before pronouncing sentence. Instead, he allowed
the prosecution to recommend consecutive sentences, in breach of the promise, and indeed followed
that recommendation in sentencing the Defendant to consecutive sentences.
The Court should have declared the matter a "misplea" and given the Defendant the
opportunity to either withdraw his plea or move forward with sentencing, which was not done.

E. Ordering the Utah Sentence to Run Consecutive to a Pre-existing Alaska Sentence,
Yet Remanding Appellant to the Utah Department of Corrections for Service of the Utah
Sentence First: The Court specifically indicated that he was to serve the Utah sentence in the
instant case consecutive to an Alaska case sentence he was presently under order out of an Alaska
9

court to serve. See Record at 125, Transcript of Sentencing, at p. 15. The Presentence Investigation
Report indicated that indeed the Defendant/Appellant had an active warrant, due to being a prison
parole escapee out of Anchorage, Alaska. See Record at 78, Presentence Investigation Report, at p.
5. The Defendant/Appellant cannot serve his Utah sentence consecutive to a sentence in Alaska
unless he is first sent to Alaska to serve his sentence there. Instead, the Court remanded the
Defendant/Appellant to the custody of the Utah Department of Corrections. It was, thus, error for
the Defendant/Appellant to be ordered to serve his Utah term consecutive to his Alaska sentence.

ARGUMENTS

A.

Ineffective assistance:

Regarding ineffective assistance of counsel, Utah law

unequivocally provides that ineffective assistance claims for defendants who plead guilty are waived
if not raised until after sentence is imposed, where no motion to withdraw plea was made prior
thereto. This Defendant pleaded guilty, no motion to withdraw plea was submitted for decision to
the judge, and any such motion was withdrawn, and the case proceeded to the point that sentence was
imposed, and the ineffective assistance claim is being made now on appeal. This court has no
jurisdiction to hear this claim. Appellate counsel submits this argument, nonetheless, at the behest
of the Appellant, after the manner of Anders.

B. Sentence Imposed: Regarding the sentence imposed, the sentencing judge sentenced the
defendant within the legal parameters for the crimes for which he was convicted, and the record does
not reveal any reasonable argument for the position that the Court abused its discretion in imposing
10

0-5 years imprisonment. Appellate counsel submits this argument, nonetheless, at the behest of the
Appellant, after the manner of Anders.

C. Motion to Withdraw Plea and For New Lawyer: Regarding the motion to withdraw
plea and for a new lawyer, that motion was withdrawn by the Defendant in the hearing thereon, and
thus was not denied by the Court, thus no valid argument for error can be made. See Record at 124.
Appellate counsel submits this argument, nonetheless, at the behest of the Appellant, after the
manner of Anders.

D. Court's Proceeding with Sentencing Despite Prosecutors5 Reneging on Promise to
Recommend Concurrent Sentences: Defense counsel at sentencing did indicate the prosecutors
promised to recommend concurrent sentences, see Record at 125, Transcript of Sentencing, at p. 5.
The prosecutor handling the sentencing hearing, however, disavowed any such promise, see id.,
Transcript of Sentencing at p. 8, though the Court responded by indicating that the promise had been
put on the record, see id.; however, the prosecutor went forward to recommend consecutive
sentences, and the Court did not respond to this departure from the promise at plea bargain. See id.
The Defendant/Appellant was entitled to have the prosecutors follow through with their
promised recommendation of concurrent sentences, and the Court, which indicated that such promise
had been made and put on the record at the time of the entry of plea, should have not ignored the
Prosecutors' departure from that promise, and should have taken action to correct the breach,
forestalling the sentencing and resolving the issue before pronouncing sentence. Instead, he allowed
the prosecution to recommend consecutive sentences, in breach of the promise, and indeed followed
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that recommendation in sentencing the Defendant to consecutive sentences.
Plea bargains are enforceable contracts, and a Defendant has a right to have the plea bargain
adhered to by the prosecutors. This Court should order a resentencing and direct that the plea
bargain term that the prosecution recommend concurrent sentences be specifically enforced, or else
give the Defendant the opportunity to withdraw his plea.
The issue boils down, essentially, to what a Court should do when there is a breach of a plea
agreement which comes to light prior to pronouncement of sentencing, i.e. a change in the
prosecution's promised recommendation. In this case, curiously, the Court essentially ignored the
breach and went forward with sentencing. What the Court should have done, and what the Utah
Supreme Court has approved of in prior case law, once it was realized that the prosecution was
changing it recommendation in breach of the plea agreement, was declare the plea a "misplea" and
give the Defendant the opportunity to either withdraw his plea or proceed to sentencing. See State
v. Kay, 111 P.2d 1294, 1306 (Utah 1986). This was not done, and it was error.
Alternatively, the Court should have specifically enforced the plea agreement and required
the State to live up to its promise. In candor to the Court, it must be stated that Utah generally does
not adhere to the plea-bargain specific performance rule adopted some jurisdictions. As the Utah
Supreme Court stated in State v. Kay, "When a defendant has taken steps in reliance on a plea
bargain that may prejudice him at a subsequent trial, many courts have granted specific enforcement
of the plea agreement (citations omitted). We choose not to follow that route." State v. Kay, 1X1 ¥2
dl294, 1306 (Utah 1986). However, this ruling from Kay comes from the context of the district
court, in that case, having only gone through with sentencing, upon the plea bargain breach issue
having been raised, after specifically having given the Defendant the opportunity to withdraw his
12

plea. Id. As the Supreme Court noted, what the trial court did was declare the plea a "misplea" and
specifically question the Defendant as to whether he wished to withdraw his plea or proceed to
sentencing. Id. at 1305 ("Applying the foregoing standard, we do not find that the trial court abused
its discretion in declaring a misplea and ordering Kay either to face sentencing or to withdraw his
plea of guilty.") Given that the trial court in the instant case did not do as the trial court in Kay had
done, remanding with directions to specifically enforce the plea bargain would be, arguably,
appropriate, despite the general rule in Utah as stated above.

E. Ordering the Utah Sentence to Run Consecutive to a Pre-existing Alaska Sentence,
Yet Remanding Appellant to the Utah Department for Service of the Utah Sentence First: The
Court specifically indicated that he was to serve the Utah sentence in the instant case consecutive
to an Alaska case sentence he was presently under order out of an Alaska court to serve. See Record
at 125, Transcript of Sentencing, at p. 15. The Presentence Investigation ELeport indicated that
indeed the Defendant/Appellant had an active warrant, due to being a prison parole escapee out of
Anchorage, Alaska.

See Record at 78, Presentence Investigation Report, at p. 5.

The

Defendant/Appellant cannot serve his Utah sentence consecutive to a sentence in Alaska unless he
is first sent to Alaska to serve his sentence there.

Instead, the Court remanded the

Defendant/Appellant to the custody of the Utah Department of Corrections. It was, thus, error for
the Defendant/Appellant to be ordered to serve his Utah term consecutive to his Alaska sentence,
since he will, according to the dictates of the sentence and the Utah incarceration pursuant thereto,
be serving his Utah sentence before ever be returned to Alaska. Appellate counsel cannot find any
direct authority addressing this issue, but it is logical and rationale to assert that error occurred in
13

ordering Defendant/Appellant to serve his sentences in this matter consecutive to a term he has had
imposed upon him in Alaska. To say that the Utah terms are to run consecutively to the Alaska term,
however, by definition means that the Utah term it to be served after the Alaska term. Yet the Court
remanded the Defendant to the Utah Department of Corrections, and thus he cannot, by definition,
serve his Utah term after his Alaska term.
CONCLUSION
One issues A, B, and C, counsel submits these issues to the Court after the manner of Anders.
As to issues D and E, the Appellant requests the Court remand the case for re-sentencing or
other appropriate proceedings necessary to correct the errors made with respect to the failure to
address the prosecutors' breach of the plea-bargain promise, i.e. direct the Court to declare a
"misplea" and give the Defendant the opportunity to either withdraw his plea or proceed with resentencing; and with an instruction to remedy the error in the sentence with respect to sentencing the
Defendant/Appellant to serve his Utah term consecutive to his Alaska term.
Dated this / Ji

day of

^y>,

20 Q S

RandallX. Allen
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM

JAN 1 9
SCOTT GARRETT (#8687)
Iron County Attorney
97 North Main, Suite #1
P.O. Box 428
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (435) 586-6694
Fax: (435) 586-2737

i m

- . ^ I B I O T COURT
FIFTH
DEPUTY

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE,
AND COMMITMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

GARY L. DEVERAUX,
Defendant.

Criminal No. 041500565
Judge G. Michael Westfall

The Defendant, GARY L. DEVERAUX, having entered pleas of guilty to the offenses of
Count I, BURGLARY OF A DWELLING, a Second-Degree Felony; Count H, POSSESSION OF
STOLEN PROPERTY, a Second-Degree Felony; and Count HI, ATTEMPTED BURGLARY OF
A DWELLING, a Third-Degree Felony; on November 30,2004, in Cedar City, Utah, and the Court
having accepted said pleas of guilty and thereafter having ordered the preparation of a presentence
investigation report, and after said report was prepared and presented to the Court, the above-entitled
matter having come on for sentencing on January 11, 2005, and the Defendant, GARY L.
DEVERAUX, having appeared before the Court in person together with his attorney of record J.
Bryan Jackson, and the State of Utah having appeared by and through Iron County Attorney Scott

Garrett, and the Court having reviewed the presentence investigation report and the file in detail,
and having further heard statements from all parties and being fully advised in the premises, now
makes and enters the following Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment, to wit:
JUDGMENT
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant, GARY L.
DEVERAUX, has been convicted of the offenses of Count I, BURGLARY OF A DWELLING, a
Second-Degree Felony; Count II, POSSESSION OF STOLEN PROPERTY, a Second-Degree
Felony; and Count HI, ATTEMPTED BURGLARY OF A DWELLING, a Third-Degree Felony; and
the Court having asked whether the Defendant had anything to say in regard to why judgment should
not be pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the contrary being shown or appearing to the Court,
it is adjudged that the Defendant is guilty as charged and convicted.
SENTENCE
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Defendant, GARY L.
DEVERAUX, and pursuant to his conviction of Count I, BURGLARY OF A DWELLING, a
Second-Degree Felony, is hereby sentenced to a term of imprisonment in the Utah State Prison for
a period of one (1) to fifteen (15) years, and the Defendant is hereby placed in the custody of the
Utah State Department of Corrections.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, GARY L. DEVERAUX, and pursuant to
his conviction of Count I, BURGLARY OF A DWELLING, a Second-Degree Felony, shall pay a
fine in the sum and amount often thousand dollars ($10,000), plus an eighty-five percent (85%)
surcharge.

2-

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, GARY L. DEVERAUX, and pursuant to
his conviction of Count I, BURGLARY OF A DWELLING, a Second-Degree Felony, shall pay a
court security fee in the sum and amount of twenty-five dollars ($25).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, GARY L. DEVERAUX, and pursuant to
his conviction of Count II, POSSESSION OF STOLEN PROPERTY, a Second-Degree Felony, is
hereby sentenced to a term of imprisonment in the Utah State Prison for a period of one (1) to fifteen
(15) years, and the Defendant is hereby placed in the custody of the Utah State Department of
Corrections.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, GARY L. DEVERAUX, and pursuant to
his conviction of Count H, POSSESSION OF STOLEN PROPERTY, a Second-Degree Felony, shall
pay a fine in the sum and amount often thousand dollars ($10,000), plus an eighty-five percent
(85%) surcharge.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, GARY L. DEVERAUX, and pursuant to
his conviction of Count H, POSSESSION OF STOLEN PROPERTY, a Second-Degree Felony, shall
pay a court security fee in the sum and amount of twenty-five dollars ($25).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, GARY L. DEVERAUX, and pursuant to
his conviction of Count HI, ATTEMPTED BURGLARY OF A DWELLING, a Third-Degree
Felony, is hereby sentenced to a term of imprisonment in the Utah State Prison for a period of zero
(0) tofive(5) years, and the Defendant is hereby placed in the custody of the Utah State Department
of Corrections.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, GARY L. DEVERAUX, and pursuant to
his conviction of Count HI, ATTEMPTED BURGLARY OF A DWELLING, a Third-Degree
Felony, shall pay a fine in the sum and amount of five thousand dollars ($5,000), plus an eighty-five
percent (85%) surcharge.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, GARY L. DEVERAUX, and pursuant to
his conviction of Count m, ATTEMPTED BURGLARY OF A DWELLING, a Third-Degree
Felony, shall pay a court security fee in the sum and amount of twenty-five dollars ($25).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the terms of imprisonment imposed upon the Defendant
for Counts I and III (Burglary of a Dwelling, a Second-Degree Felony, one to fifteen years; and
Attempted Burglary of a Dwelling, a Third-Degree Felony, zero to five years) shall be served
concurrently, one with the other.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the term of imprisonment imposed upon the Defendant
for Count II (Possession of Stolen Property, a Second-Degree Felony, one to fifteen years) shall be
served consecutively to the other terms of imprisonment imposed herein.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the sentences imposed herein shall be served consecutively
to any other sentence the Defendant may currently be serving.
COMMITMENT
TO THE SHERIFF OF IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH:
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to take the Defendant, GARY L. DEVERAUX, and
deliver him to the Utah State Department of Corrections in Draper, Utah, thereto be kept and
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confined in accordance with the above and foregoing Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment.
DATED this

I /

M

day of January, 2005.
BY THE COURT:

jU±

J^^ftCH/AEL WESTFALL
Di^tricVCourt Judge
C^RTIBiCATE
STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss.
COUNTY OF IRON )
I, CAROLYN BULLOCH, Clerk of the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Iron County,
State of Utah, hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true, and exact copy of the original
Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment in the case entitled State of Utah vs. Gary L. Deveraux.
Criminal No. 041500565, now on file and of record in my office.
WITNESS my hand and the seal of said office in Cedar City, County of Iron, State of Utah,
this

(_ fir
day of January, 2005.

C

i-^v LYN

BULLOCH

CAROLYN BULLOCH
District Court Clerk

By:

y
*
/ A• / /
ActrS2^/ ,/ 7 k ^

Deputy District Court)'

5-

-.

CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I hand-delivered a full, true, and correct copy of the within and
foregoing JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, AND COMMITMENT, on this

1^-

day of January,

2005, to J. Bryan Jackson, Attorney for Defendant, at the office of the Iron County Attorney, 97
North Main Street, Suite 1, Cedar City, UT 84720.

\QAOAssistant

6-

IN T H E D I S T R I C T C O U R T O F T H E FIFTH J U D I C I A L DIST
IRON C O U N T Y , STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

cND F O R

'le^k

ORDER OF BAIL OR COMMITMENT
OR RELEASE

vs
Case No
Defendant

On the J Cffl
day of C F l f K )OLVL\ , 20QSfthe above-named defendant appeared before
this Court on the following charges &

l - The^ foj/fori. S-folen Cfaprhj
3 ^ AH: > S( A^lnw J r f ftxfel UQg
The following order(s) was made
Bail is set in the amount of $
^(
The defendant is remanded to the custody of the.Iron County Sheriff pending
transportation to the Utah State Prison to serve a term off(—/t<? CA (HTQirs^OnPiCilffW

i

i n\
^
"TO U\ • ^

i-(6 onC4£-(WseouWt

The defendant is remanded to the custody of the Iron County Sheriff tojserye, ,
, , aL \
days in the Iron County Ja.l
L - O ^ f o Off OV 5 . ( J O f l C U f V & v4 - f o O V * I
The defendant is ordered to report to the Iron County Jail on
serve his jail sentence
1) With no work release^
2) With work release as follows
The defendant is ordered to be released from custody on
The defendant is due back in Court on

Dated this

itth

day of

to

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certified that on the

\ * day of

^^f

200^3 caused a true and correct copy

of the foregoing to be served via mailing by US Mail first class postage prepaid to:

Assistant Attorneys General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854

